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Chapter 1
Leadership Model
Leandro Almeida, Jose´ Cruz, Helena Ferreira and Alberto A. Pinto
Abstract The Theory of Planned Behavior studies the decision-making mechanisms
of individuals. We propose the Nash Equilibria as one, of many, possible mecha-
nisms of transforming human intentions in behavior. This process corresponds to
the best strategic individual decision taking in account the collective response. We
built a game theoretical model to understand the role of leaders in decision-making
of individuals or groups. We study the characteristics of the leaders that can have a
positive or negative influence over others behavioral decisions.
1.1 Introduction
The main goal in Planned Behavior or Reasoned Action Theories (see Ajzen [1],
Baker [5] ) is to understand and forecast how individuals turn intentions into be-
haviors. In Almeida, Cruz, Ferreira and Pinto [4], it is created a game theoretical
model, inspired in the works of J. Cownley [7] and M. Wooders [6, 7], where it is
considered individual characteristics of the individuals described as taste type and
crowding type. The taste type characterizes the inner characteristics of an individual
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underlying their welfare function. The crowding type of an individual character-
izes his influence in the welfare function of the other individuals. In the works of
J. Driskel [9], of E. Salas [8, 9] and R. Sternberg [11] is presented a definition of
leader as the individual that can influence others. In Almeida, Cruz, Ferreira and
Pinto [2], it is presented a possible psychological/mathematical concept of leaders.
We study the characteristics of the leaders that have a positive or negative influence
over others behavioral decisions. This chapter surveys the theory of Planned Behav-
ior from a game theoretical point of view and the leaders impact in individual/group
decision-making (see [2, 4]).
1.2 Theory of Planned Behavior or Reasoned Action
The Theory of Planned Behavior or Reasoned Action can be summarized in Fig. 1
(see Ajzen [1]), where we can observe that external variables are divided in three
categories: intrapersonal associated to individual actions; interpersonal associated
to the interaction of the individual with others and sociocultural associated to so-
cial values. This external variables influence, especially, the intermediate variables
which are also subdivided in three major items. The social norms can be the opin-
ions, conceptions and judgments that others have about a certain behavior (e.g: the
others think I should stop smoking or I should do more exercise); attitudes are per-
sonal opinions in favor or against a specific behavior (e.g: I like to do exercise, it
would be good to stop smoking); and self-efficacy is the extent of ability to control
a certain behavior (e.g: I can do exercise, I can stop smoking). These external and
intermediate variables determine a consequent intention to adopt a certain behavior.
Fig. 1.1 Theory of Planned Behavior
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1.3 Game Theoretical Model
In [4], we define a game theoretical model, that we pass to describe. Let us consider
a finite number S of individuals. For each individual s ∈ S, we distinguish two types
of characteristics: taste and crowding type.
We associate to each individual s ∈ S its taste type T (s) = t ∈ T that describes
the individuals inner characteristics, not always observable by the other individuals.
We also associate to each individual s ∈ S its crowding type C (s) = c ∈C that de-
scribes the individuals characteristics observed by the others and that can influence
the welfare of the others. We associate, in the Theory of Planned Behavior or Rea-
soned Action, the intrapersonal external variables and the attitude and self-efficacy
intermediate variables to the the taste type and the interpersonal and sociocultural
external variables and the social norms intermediate variable to the crowding type
(see Almeida et al.[4]).
The individuals, with their own characteristics, can define a strategy G : S→ G, i.e
each individual s ∈ S chooses the group/behavior that he would like to belong G (s).
Each strategy G corresponds to an intention in the Theory of Planned Behavior.
Given a group/behavior strategy G : S→ G, the crowding vector m(G ) ∈ (NC)G is
the vector whose components mgc = m
g
c(G ) are the number of individuals in g that
have crowding type c ∈C, i.e.
mgc = #{s ∈ S : G (s) = g∧C (s) = c} .
We denote by st,c the individual s with taste type t and crowding type c. We mea-
sure the level of welfare, or personal satisfaction, that an individual st,c acquires by
belonging to a group/behavior g ∈ G with crowding vector m(G ), using the utility
function ut,c : G× (NC)G→ R defined by
ut,c(g,mG) =V
g
t,c+ f
g
t,c(m
G)
where (i) V gt,c measures the satisfaction level that each individual st,c has in belong-
ing to a group/behavior g ∈ G,(ii) f gt,c(mG) measures the satisfaction level that an
individual st,c has taking in account, for each crowding type c′ ∈C, the interaction
with the elements mgc′ that choose the group/behavior g ∈ G.
The group/behavior strategy G ∗ : S→ G is a Nash Equilibrium group/behavior, if
given the choice options of all individuals, no individual feels motivated to change
his group/behavior, i.e its utility does not increase by changing his group/behavior
decision (see Pinto [10]).
The dictionary between our game theoretical model and the Theory of Planned Be-
havior is summarized in Fig. 2 (see Almeida [3]).
In what follows we will assume, for simplicity, that f gt,c : (NC)G→ R is affine, i.e.
f gt,c(m
G) =−Ag,ct,c + ∑
c′∈C
Ag,c
′
t,c m
g
c′ , (1.1)
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Fig. 1.2 Game Theoretical Model / Theory of Planned Behavior
where Ag,c
′
t,c evaluates the satisfaction that each individual st,c has with the presence
of an individual with crowding type c in g. We note that Ag,ct,c appears in equation 1.1
because the individual st,c does not count in the number of individuals st,c with the
same taste and crowding type that also choose group/behavior g.
We denote by S(t,c) the group of all individuals st,c with the same taste type t ∈ T and
the same crowding type c ∈C. Let n(t,c) correspond to the number of individuals
in S(t,c).
An interesting alternative way to interpret S(t,c) is to consider that n(t,c) is the
number of times that a same individual st,c has to take an action. In this case,
Ag,ct,c > 0 can be interpreted as the individual positive reward by repeating the same
group/behavior choice g ∈ G, i.e the individual st,c does not feel a saturation effect
by repeating the same choice. On the other hand, Ag,ct,c < 0 can be interpreted as the
individual negative reward by repeating the same group/behavior choice g ∈ G, i.e
the individual st,c feels a saturation, boredom or frustration effect by repeating the
same choice.
1.4 Leadership in a Game Theoretical Model
A leader is an individual that can influence the others to choose a certain group/ be-
havior. We consider that the leader makes his group/behavior decision first than
the others and the others already know the leader decision before taking their
group/behavior decision. The leader’s choice can depend more on the group he val-
uates (what he likes) or on the individuals that are in a certain group/behavior (who
he likes to be with). Let us consider the leaders
(
t l ,cl
)
that influence the followers(
t f ,c f
)
and that prefer what they like. They are characterized by the parameters
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(α,R,V,L) that we pass to describe. The leader (t l ,cl) values V the group/behavior
g. The leader donates a part (1− R)V to the followers and, so, the parameter R
determines the donation (1−R)V of the good V from the leader to the followers.
After the donation, the new valuation of the leader (t l ,cl) for the group/behavior g
is V g
t l ,cl
= RV . We define α as the parameter of the consumption or wealth creation
on the valuation of the good distributed by the leader to the followers. Therefore,
the new valuation of the leader (t f ,c f ) of the good V is given by
V gt f ,c f = V¯
g
t f ,c f +
α(1−R)
n(t f ,c f )
V
where V¯ gt f ,c f corresponds to the previous valuation of the group, by the followers
(t f ,c f ).
According to the values of the described parameters we can now distinguish two
types of leaders: the altruist and the individualist.
The altruist leader 0 < R< 1 is the one that distributes a (positive) valuation to the
followers of group/behavior g: if α > 1 there is a wealth creation by the followers
(t f ,c f ) from the wealth that the leader distributes but if 0 < α < 1 there is a wealth
consumption by the followers (t f ,c f ) from the wealth that the leader distributes.
The individualist leader R > 1 is the one that gives a devaluation or debt to the
followers of the group/behavior g: if 0 < α < 1 there is a decrease of the debt by the
followers (t f ,c f ) from the debt that the leader distributes, but if α > 1 there is an
increase of the debt by the followers (t f ,c f ) from the debt that the leader distributes.
We can also consider that the influence of the leaders (t l ,cl) personality in the fol-
lowers (t f ,c f ) is measured by the parameter L≥ 0 where
Ag,c
l
t f ,c f = LA
g,c f
t f ,c f
corresponds to the satisfaction that the followers have in being with the leader. This
way, if 0 < L < 1 then the followers have less satisfaction in being with the leader
rather than being with the followers; if L = 1 then the followers have the same
satisfaction in being with the leader and with the followers; and if L > 1 then the
followers have more satisfaction in being with the leader rather than being with the
followers.
Notice that the valuations of leaders (t l ,cl) concerning the others match the valua-
tions of the followers:
Ag
′,c′
t l ,cl
= Ag
′,c′
t f ,c f
and that the other parameters of the leaders match the ones from the followers and
the remaining parameters of all the individuals are kept the same.
We define theworst neighbors LWNg(t f ,c f ) of the individual st,c in the group/behavior
g by
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LWNg(t f ,c f ) =

∑
c′∈C,Ag,c′t,c <0
Ag,c
′
t,c ∑t ′∈T n(t ′,c′) if A
g,c f
t f ,c f ≥ 0
−Ag,c ft f ,c f +∑c′∈C,Ag,c′t,c <0A
g,c′
t,c ∑t ′∈T n(t ′,c′) if A
g,c f
t f ,c f < 0
We define the best neighbors LBNg′(t f ,c f ) of the individual st,c in the group/behavior
g′ by
LBNg′(t
f ,c f ) =

−Ag′,c ft f ,c f +∑c′∈C,Ag′,c′t,c >0A
g′,c′
t,c ∑t ′∈T n(t ′,c′) if A
g′,c f
t f ,c f ≥ 0
∑
c′∈C,Ag′,c′t,c >0
Ag
′,c′
t,c ∑t ′∈T n(t ′,c′) if A
g′,c f
t f ,c f < 0
Theorem 1. Let the leader (t l ,cl) choose the group/behavior g ∈ G. For every g′ ∈
G\{g}, if
α(1−R)
n(t f ,c f )
V +LAg,c
f
t f ,c f >V
g′
t f ,c f −V
g
t f ,c f +LBNg′(t
f ,c f )−LWNg(t f ,c f ) (1.2)
then G ∗(St,c) = g, for all Nash Equilibrium G ∗.
Hence, inequality 1.2 gives a sufficient condition in the value of the donation (1−
R)V and in the influence L of the leader over the followers, guarantying that the
leader convinces the followers to choose the same group/behavior g as the leader.
Let LI and LA be the minimum influence values of the individualist and the altruist
leader, respectively, over the followers, for inequality 1.2 to hold. Since LI > LA then
the individualist leader might have to be more persuasive than the altruist leader.
Theorem 1 is proved in [2].
1.5 Conclusion
We have described how the theories of Planned Behavior or Reasoned Action study
the decision-making mechanisms of individuals and we proposed the Nash equi-
libria as one, of many, possible mechanisms of transforming human intentions in
behavior. We studied the role of leaders in this game theoretical model. We pre-
sented a possible psychological/mathematical concept of leaders and we studied
their characteristics that have influence over others behavioral decisions.
We note that this work along with some other works of Alberto Adrego Pinto, Stan-
ley Osher, from University of California, and Philip Kumar Maini, from University
of Oxford, were highlighted in the article Maths for movies, medicine & markets
of the newspaper The Telegraph Calcutta, India, writen by G.S. Mudur, after being
presented at ICM 2010 (see http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100920/jsp/knowhow/
story 12955440.jsp).
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